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ABSTRACT 39	   	  40	  
Within public policy and academic discourses, high-speed rail (HSR) is presented as a way of 41	  
achieving “smarter” or more sustainable forms of growth. Realizing this promise requires 42	  
coordinated policy efforts across levels of government and at different moments along a project’s 43	  
timeline. The research presented here makes use of a systems perspective to study the barriers to- 44	  
and opportunities of inter-jurisdictional HSR planning. The paper draws on interview material 45	  
with officials involved in the Portuguese and United Kingdom HSR planning processes.  46	  
 Uncertainty is found to be of significant relevance to the manner in which national and 47	  
local or regional governments interact. Those interactions in turn affect the realized physical 48	  
reality of the HSR network and its integration into existing land use and transport systems. The 49	  
paper examines two sources of uncertainty—uncertainty of outcomes and the uncertainty of a 50	  
multi-actor inter-jurisdictional system of control.  51	  
 Case studies are used to explore how existing processes and evaluations mechanisms 52	  
affect the level to which local knowledge and initiatives are incorporated into iterative HSR 53	  
system design. The research additionally reveals how initial conditions can be important 54	  
determinants of HSR success by shaping a system’s ability to adapt to realizations of currently 55	  
uncertain futures. 56	  
 The paper concludes by offering two approaches to building a HSR implementation 57	  
process that successfully incorporates HSR-supportive local and regional policies. The 58	  
approaches combine formal inter-jurisdictional planning commitments with informal coalition 59	  
building, to together enhance HSR’s ability to achieve its full potential.60	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INTRODUCTION 61	  
 62	  
The spatial and distributional sustainability agenda of HSR 63	  
 64	  
Within public policy and academic discourses, HSR is presented as a way of achieving “smarter” 65	  
or more sustainable forms of growth (e.g. 1, 2). Adopting the 3E definition of sustainability, 66	  
HSR’s potential can be described as follows: 67	  
• Economy: this is most often the starting point for advocates of HSR. The goal is to 68	  
relieve congestion within larger urban areas, overcome distance, and build 69	  
competitive networks of cities that act as functional economic units in the global 70	  
market (3, 4); 71	  
• Environment: environmental sustainability acts at (at least) two spatial scales. HSR 72	  
can reintroduce incentives for compact urban growth, locally, which in turn can 73	  
benefit regional ecosystems by helping to preserve habitats and protect watersheds in 74	  
the interstitial, less developed, spaces of a region (5). Independent of land use 75	  
impacts, HSR can also be more energy-efficient than competitive modes. 76	  
• Equity: this may be the most difficult goal to define and achieve. Understood in 77	  
spatial terms, the ambition is as follows: by connecting central and peripheral areas, a 78	  
more efficient economic system can be built that will bring benefit to all parts of a 79	  
region, even including smaller cities and those without direct HSR service (6). 80	  
As in other complex spatial planning regimes (e.g. environmental, metropolitan transportation), 81	  
successful achievement of each aspect listed above requires coordinated policy efforts across 82	  
levels of government and at different moments along a project’s timeline. And while much can 83	  
be learned from the literature on inter-jurisdictional planning at the metropolitan or regional 84	  
scale (e.g. 7), HSR demands a scale of analysis that is yet more extensive (3, 5). For example, 85	  
station location is largely determined at the national (or sometimes international) level of 86	  
government and fairly early on in the process of system design. The selected station location—87	  
whether external to a city or more centrally accessible—will then be a major driver of 88	  
subsequent decisions and sustainability outcomes. Land use policies that can be used to support 89	  
compact station-oriented development or transit access to stations, on the other hand, are 90	  
primarily under the control of local authorities, and will likely need to evolve over time as local 91	  
demand responds to the improved accessibility provided by new HSR service. Still, the universe 92	  
of options available for land use and transportation planning at the local and regional levels is 93	  
constrained by higher-level decisions regarding the location of a station relative to the urban area 94	  
being served. 95	  
 96	  
HSR as a complex system 97	  
 98	  
Because of its multi-scalar and multi-actor nature, HSR is best understood as a complex system 99	  
that includes both its physical components and the institutional sphere within which it resides 100	  
(8). The research presented here makes use of a systems perspective to study the barriers to- and 101	  
opportunities of inter-jurisdictional HSR planning. Working from the understanding that 102	  
technological change must be coupled with institutional change (8), we investigate multiple 103	  
scales of both the physical environment and institutional sphere and address the importance of 104	  
uncertainty as a driver of system behavior.  105	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 Complexity and uncertainty are intertwined phenomenon that trace to a variety of factors 106	  
including the existence of interdependencies and feedback loops in both a project’s management 107	  
structure and in the architecture of the product itself (for example, the feedback between changes 108	  
in accessibility and changes in land use patterns). Lessard, et al. develop a conceptual model of 109	  
complexity that treats technical and organizational complexity as project dimensions from which 110	  
performance emerges. In a survey of 45 major projects, they found that "the interaction of 111	  
technical complexity and organizational complexity had a more important effect on project 112	  
project’s performance than their independent individual contributions" (9). In that vein, this 113	  
paper focuses on uncertainty at the interface between technical and institutional complexity. 114	  
 115	  
Broad ambition, broad tools 116	  
 117	  
HSR projects are unique in that they pursue socioeconomic objectives that extend beyond the 118	  
direct transportation investment purpose of reducing travel time to indirect effects often not 119	  
accounted for in traditional benefit-cost analyses. New mobility patterns and land use changes 120	  
that are the target of HSR investment can be quite challenging to predict with any level of 121	  
precision (11). Moreover, the policies that may be used to influence these outcomes are 122	  
controlled by a wide variety of government entities, spread across sectors and between national, 123	  
regional, and local jurisdictions. 124	  
 These two sources of uncertainty—uncertainty of outcomes (technical complexity) and 125	  
the uncertainty of a multi-actor inter-jurisdictional system of control (institutional complexity)—126	  
present challenges to the HSR planning process. The broad scope of HSR’s ambition requires 127	  
that existing methods of project evaluation and ongoing management at the (usually) national 128	  
scale be expanded to make use of a diverse set of tools and forms of knowledge from other 129	  
geographic scales of government. For example, a national infrastructure agency may be the 130	  
entity with the most knowledge and background on how to deliver a rail system. However, 131	  
national governments have not traditionally been involved directly in development schemes, and 132	  
may have few precedents for dealing with the long-term uncertainties characteristic of land use 133	  
related projects. In this realm, more localized governmental entities (e.g. municipal governments, 134	  
regional transit agencies) have experience, knowledge, and tools to offer. Specifically, local and 135	  
regional knowledge are necessary to ensure that a station integrates well with its urban context 136	  
(e.g. via zoning or development schemes) and is consistent with existing or planned mobility 137	  
systems. Outcome and institutional uncertainty cannot be eliminated, but they can be better 138	  
managed through inter-jurisdictional planning and cooperative ongoing system management. 139	  
 140	  
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 141	   	  142	  
Expanded commute-sheds and a focus on smaller intermediate HSR cities 143	  
 144	  
This paper analyzes five different proposed HSR stops in two countries—three in Portugal and 145	  
two in the UK.1 Together these cases provides insight into specific types of uncertainty, the 146	  
challenges these forms of uncertainty can presents for effective HSR planning, and potential 147	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Access to key government stakeholders in Portugal was provided under the umbrella of the MIT Portugal Program, 
a multi-year international collaboration that targets transportation as a key area for economic and social impact. 
Interviews and site visits in the UK were facilitated by collaboration between then MIT Transit Lab and Transport 
for London.  
Stein and Sussman      5 	  
strategies for managing those challenges. We focus on smaller intermediate cities brought within 148	  
one-hour’s travel time of a larger metropolis (here, Lisbon or London) by planned HSR services. 149	  
Mid-distance service (<250 km) has particularly strong spatial implications (10) as it can forge 150	  
commuting relationships between cities and expand labor markets to the scale of new 151	  
discontinuous regions— single labor and commercial markets that spans large distances but do 152	  
not include all intermediate areas (5,12, 23). Portugal and the United Kingdom (UK) are 153	  
planning HSR that will provide this type of service. Évora, Leiria, and Coimbra would each be 154	  
brought within one hour’s travel time of Lisbon by the proposed HSR network.2 Similarly, Old 155	  
Oak Common in the western part of Greater London and Birmingham City Center in central UK 156	  
would both become part of the easily accessible London labor market should the proposed HS2 157	  
network be built. 158	  
 Both the Portuguese and British projects are aimed at, among other things, using HSR to 159	  
support network agglomeration at the inter-city scale. The planned Portuguese HSR network 160	  
aims to create a functionally linked system of cities, each playing their own mutually supportive 161	  
role, that can better compete in the global market (13). The UK project is posited as a way of 162	  
addressing growth constraints in London while simultaneously encouraging growth in the rest of 163	  
the country (14).  164	  
 Agglomeration is the benefit that firms and workers gain from being in proximity to other 165	  
firms and workers. Studies of agglomeration economies traditionally conceived of proximity in 166	  
space as the enabling factor for these interactions. However, it may be possible to use HSR to 167	  
benefit from network-based agglomeration economies (15) at the scale of a discontinuous region. 168	  
Agglomeration increases with increased human interaction. To fully capitalize on this potential 169	  
requires a focus on the human aspects of the interface between cities and the HSR network. 170	  
Making the connection as seamless as possible, from initial origin to final destination, will 171	  
remove barriers to interaction and maximize the realization of benefits from networked 172	  
agglomeration (4). Therefore, benefits at the scale of the HSR network actually depend on 173	  
localized issues of urban form and station accessibility, and therefore on the degree to which 174	  
local considerations are successfully integrated into a national HSR planning process. 175	  
 Secondary cities are an important subject of study for a number of reasons. In comparison 176	  
to more dominant metropolises, smaller cities are often disadvantaged in terms of planning 177	  
resources and advocacy power. They require explicit attention if HSR is to achieve its objective 178	  
of supporting sustainable forms of future growth. In economic terms, good planning at the local 179	  
level is necessary to provide seamless accessibility between a large metropolis and newly 180	  
connected secondary cities, and to thus capitalize on agglomeration benefits. Regarding equity 181	  
goals, smaller cities play an important distributional role in bringing HSR benefits to a broader 182	  
area. Finally, in environmental terms, smaller cities are often the most at risk for sprawling forms 183	  
of growth. Greenfield development is often easier and less costly than reinvestment in existing 184	  
urban centers. City-center locations need other qualities to be competitive with more suburban 185	  
locations. In big metropolitan areas like Lisbon, the benefits of agglomeration economies—186	  
clustering of important firms, labor pooling, and high quality local transportation and urban 187	  
quality—can be enough to tip the balance in favor of more urban locations. For smaller cities, 188	  
these forces alone may not be enough. The increment in accessibility provided by a HSR station 189	  
can reintroduce incentives for compact centralized growth (16). 190	  
 191	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Implementation of HSR in Portugal is currently postponed for the immediately foreseeable future due to fiscal 
austerity. Nevertheless, lessons can be drawn from the process up to this point. 
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Long timelines and the importance of initial conditions 192	  
 193	  
Project design and evaluation are iterative processes. Under the long-term uncertainty 194	  
characteristic of large infrastructure projects, technical alternatives will necessarily evolve over 195	  
time as new information and new situations require. The case of Portugal makes it amply clear 196	  
that exogenous economic and political trends can drastically affect both the timing and design of 197	  
an infrastructure project. Therefore, taking a robust systems perspective means that we not only 198	  
design organizations to govern HSR infrastructure and operations, but that we also think 199	  
carefully about the streams of planning decisions (the processes) into which the project will 200	  
enter. Effective strategic planning is more than a matter of finding, with some ‘black box,’ the 201	  
‘optimal’ design solution and then choosing the best delivery vehicle for that design (although 202	  
this is undoubtedly close to reality for certain parts of the technical system). Rather, design and 203	  
implementation will also be an exercise in discovery and continual adaptation (17). In particular, 204	  
integrating HSR into local contexts will involve uncovering and responding to local knowledge 205	  
and needs, taking advantage of available policy instruments at the local level, and continually 206	  
adapting to the changing development prospects and the realization of actual HSR demand. 207	  
 Whether intentionally or unintentionally, HSR will build on what is already in the areas 208	  
served (local economy, demographics, local transport). As policy makers and engineers, we are 209	  
interested in the ‘levers’ that can be intentionally influenced and built upon.  Existing processes 210	  
and evaluations mechanisms affect the level to which diverse channels of knowledge are 211	  
incorporated into ongoing and iterative system design. Dunn discusses the difference between 212	  
deliberate and emergent strategies (18, adapted from 19). Deliberate strategy is intentional and 213	  
objective-driven. It can be reflected in both plans and in rules or processes adopted by an 214	  
organization (20). Over time, as an organization responds to changes in its environment, it will 215	  
continue to make decisions. Some will be based on the original plans and adopted rules while 216	  
others are adapted to suit new conditions. The actual trajectory of decisions is what Dunn refers 217	  
to as emergent strategy.  218	  
 The inevitability of emergent strategy in projects we discuss in this paper does not 219	  
invalidate or reduce the need for deliberate strategy. Quite the opposite: components of 220	  
deliberate strategy including initial decisions regarding technical alternatives, the definitions of 221	  
performance, and decision-making processes can set the stage for better emergent strategy. In the 222	  
case of HSR, ongoing decision-making will depend, in part, on the networks of communication 223	  
and control in place between various stakeholders. It will also depend on the degree to which 224	  
initial decisions anticipate and establish the flexibility to deal with both known and unknown 225	  
unknowns. The case studies presented in the following section reveal ways in which initial 226	  
conditions can act as important determinants of HSR success by shaping system’s ability to adapt 227	  
to realizations of currently uncertain futures. 228	  
  229	  
UNCERTAINTY AND MULTI-SCALAR HSR PLANNING – INSIGHTS FROM 230	  
PORTUGAL AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 231	   	  232	  
The following studies are based on meetings with government stakeholders in Portugal and the 233	  
UK. In Portugal interviews were conducted with representatives from the national rail 234	  
infrastructure agency and with local officials in Évora, Leiria, and Coimbra in January 2012. A 235	  
more complete account of material from these interviews can be found in (5).  Subsequently in 236	  
January 2013 additional interviews were conducted with representatives from the UK national 237	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HSR planning agency (HS2 Ltd.), Transport for London, the City of Birmingham, and Centro, 238	  
the regional transit regulator serving the area around Birmingham. 239	  
 240	  
TABLE 1 Summary of Case Studies 241	  
Station 
Location 
Role in Urban 
Hierarchy 
Distance from Major 
City Increment in Accessibility from HSR 
Coimbra 
3rd largest city in 
Portugal, dominant city 
within the Centro region 
200 road kilometers (124 
miles) north of Lisbon and 
125 road kilometers (78 
miles) south of Porto 
HSR would bring Coimbra within 56 
minutes of Lisbon (compared to 1:50 hours 
by car or 2 hours by train). 
Leiria 
Secondary city within 
the polycentric Centro 
region of Portugal 
135 road kilometers (84 
miles) north of Lisbon 
HSR would bring Leiria within 36 minutes 
of Lisbon—a considerable increment from 
current conventional rail service, which is 
slowed by intermediate stops and requires 
transfers for 2 out of the 5 daily trains. 
Évora 
Small city of 50,000 
known for its historic 
center, university, and 
scenic agricultural 
setting 
135 road kilometers (84 
miles) east of Lisbon 
HSR would provide a considerable 
increment in accessibility, offering 30-
minute travel times and 12 trains per day, 
compared to 4 trains currently with a travel 
time of nearly 2 hours. 
Birmingham 
Second largest city in 
the UK and the 
dominant city within the 
region of the West 
Midlands 
110 miles (180 km) north 
of London 
HSR would offer access to central London 
in less than 50 minutes, compared to 1:40 
hours by train or 2:10 by car. 
Old Oak 
Common 
A neighborhood - part 
of the Greater London 
Authority (GLA) 
Approximately 8 miles (13 
km) northwest of central 
London 
Old Oak Common would provide 
congestion relief to the central HSR station 
at Euston and is viewed as an opportunity 
to create a strategic transportation 
interchange for west London. 
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Table 1 summarizes key aspects of the five proposed HSR stops analyzed, including their 242	  
location, role within the urban hierarchy, and the increment in accessibility expected from 243	  
planned HSR service. 244	  
 245	  
Cooperative multi-scalar planning and robust system design 246	  
 247	  
The case of Coimbra offers an example of formalized multi-scalar planning. The simultaneously 248	  
local and national/global relevance of HSR creates conditions in which local and national 249	  
planning entities share interests and therefore have incentives to partner in ongoing planning 250	  
efforts. Viewing the Coimbra municipal government as an indispensible partner in the 251	  
development of Portuguese HSR, the national infrastructure agency REFER chose to enter into a 252	  
formal cooperative protocol with the City of Coimbra. Together they are managing an 253	  
urbanization plan for the HSR station-area. The plan includes provisions for a multimodal hub 254	  
and a new area of development (Interview, REFER, unpublished data). 255	  
 Interesting in its own right as a form of inter-jurisdictional collaboration, the Coimbra 256	  
Urbanization Plan is also attractive as a potential solution to the problem: how can local and 257	  
national plans regarding HSR and station-areas be coordinated in a manner that effectively deals 258	  
with long-term uncertainty? A formalized relationship between the City of Coimbra and REFER 259	  
enables coordination of both initial design decisions and ongoing management. Bi-directional 260	  
communication helped support a station design that can work in multiple future scenarios—261	  
including the suspension of the HSR project itself. The future of HSR in Portugal and the 262	  
Coimbra Urbanization Plan remains uncertain due to fiscal constraints. Nevertheless, the joint 263	  
planning process did yield a more flexible design approach: if the more general Coimbra station 264	  
plan goes ahead with conventional rail and bus transit but without HSR, it will be designed so as 265	  
to not preclude future expansion to accommodate HSR passengers (Interview, REFER, 266	  
unpublished data). 267	  
 Thus, collaboration between a national HSR planning entity and local governments is 268	  
likely to not only improve the integration of HSR into local land use and mobility systems but 269	  
also to produce more robust station and station-area designs that can perform under multiple 270	  
future scenarios. 271	   	  272	  
External station locations as a constraint on future benefits 273	  
 274	  
Évora and Leiria are two smaller cities in Portugal with proposed HSR service of less than one 275	  
hour’s travel time to Lisbon—a considerable accessibility improvement from present service 276	  
levels (Table 1). Despite the promising increment in accessibility, however, Évora and Leiria 277	  
present interesting cases of the “last mile” problem and the effect that station placement can have 278	  
both on development prospects and on the potential involvement of local governments in HSR-279	  
supportive planning.  280	  
Unlike Coimbra, both are slated to have external – outside the urban core—HSR stations. 281	  
In interviews, local planning officials in Évora expressed concern about the impact of a station 282	  
located 9 km outside the city. The city feels that it should maintain the strength of its core and for 283	  
this reason has already turned down one proposal for a new service-industry development in the 284	  
vicinity of the station. They believed that external development would not deliver benefits to the 285	  
established urban core (Interview, Évora, unpublished data). Station location can be a powerful 286	  
determinant of not only local land-use impacts, but also of the level of interest and attention that 287	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local governments pay to HSR-supportive initiatives. Partially due to the planned non-central 288	  
location of their stations, both Évora and Leiria have favored a ‘wait-and-see’ planning approach 289	  
to HSR. With less obvious development potential, an external station creates fewer incentives for 290	  
local involvement, thus causing a loss of specialized knowledge—as well as lost levers of 291	  
influence (zoning, local transport or public realm investments, etc.) for the overall HSR planning 292	  
and implementation process. 293	  
Thus, decisions that occur fairly early on in an HSR planning process regarding the siting 294	  
of station have long-term implications for development outcomes and for the ways in which local 295	  
or regional stakeholders are likely to be integrated into a national planning and implementation 296	  
process. This influential decision stems from an evaluation process that struggles to assess 297	  
uncertain but significant future benefits, relative to more certain and more immediate costs. In 298	  
particular, the decision gives disproportionate weight to current rather than targeted future 299	  
conditions. Stations in places like Évora and Leiria are sited outside the city to a) reduce HSR 300	  
travel times between dominant O-D pairs, b) provide easy auto access to a region as a whole, and 301	  
c) avoid localized monetary and environmental costs associated with construction in an already 302	  
built up area.  303	  
What such a decision does not acknowledge is the longer-term growth impacts of HSR 304	  
service, as opposed to the demands coming from existing categories of users who may prefer 305	  
easy regional automobile access. Central stations have been shown to be better for destination 306	  
users (as opposed to outbound users who originate in these small cities) and in Spain have also 307	  
proven better for building up business in smaller cities (23). A city is most likely to benefit from 308	  
new HSR if it its connectivity enables two-way interactions with other cities—particularly with a 309	  
major metropolis located less than one hour away. Based on evidence from China, Zheng and 310	  
Kahn argue that secondary cities stand to gain much from participation in a two-fold improved 311	  
matching process: first, a matching between residential locations in less expensive and less 312	  
congested cities and jobs in larger metropolis labor markets and second, a matching between 313	  
various firm functions and the different forms of accessibility and proximity offered across a 314	  
region integrated by HSR. HSR, they claim, can “encourage firm fragmentation and firm sorting 315	  
depending on their idiosyncratic demand for megacity access” (24). 316	  
It is easier to attract new businesses to areas that already have some critical mass of 317	  
activity, because developers see this as less risky. As that prior concentration tends to be in more 318	  
central locations, a centrally located HSR station has more to build on to attract investment than 319	  
the accessibility increment from HSR alone. While entirely new developments are not 320	  
impossible, they depend to a much more significant degree on securing anchor tenants that 321	  
inspire enough confidence for other developers to invest. Therefore, while more short-term 322	  
objectives can be met with an external station placement, longer-term land use and growth 323	  
objectives point towards choosing a more central location. 324	  
It is common in project evaluation to grapple with costs that have greater certainty and 325	  
predictability than do benefits. This difficulty, we find, is only magnified by the fact that HSR is 326	  
aimed far beyond the needs of current long distance travelers, to future regional and economic 327	  
opportunities connections that have yet to be realized or perhaps even fully imagined. The 328	  
solution is not obvious. If the scope for a cost-benefit analysis is drawn too narrowly, longer term 329	  
economic and development impacts in station-areas may be neglected. On the other hand, if the 330	  
scope is too broad, the national planning agency will be faced with intractable uncertainties in 331	  
predicting land use changes and resulting value added. 332	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The following section of this paper investigates a case from the UK in which local 333	  
governmental entities and a national HSR planning agency are at odds over the appropriate scope 334	  
of a cost-benefit analysis and whether or not to consider a more optimistic but also more 335	  
uncertain set of planned future developments around a proposed HSR station. 336	  
 337	  
Uncertainty and the challenge of integrating local station-area plans 338	  
 339	  
Birmingham sits atop the regional hierarchy of the West Midlands. HS2, the UK’s HSR project, 340	  
offers the chance to enhance this position while also bringing Birmingham within easy 341	  
commuting distance of central London (25). 342	  
Two interrelated local Birmingham projects predate the HS2 planning process: the 343	  
Midland Metro extension and a new economic development initiative on the east side of 344	  
downtown Birmingham (Figure 1). Phase 2 of the Midland Metro extension is intended to link 345	  
New Street Station, another key rail interchange in Birmingham, with the HS2 station and 346	  
beyond (26). In the same area is the City Centre Enterprise Zone, set up by the Greater 347	  
Birmingham and Solihull LEP (a local development body) in April 2011 prior to approval of the 348	  
HS2 preferred route in 2012. It covers twenty-six sites including three that are adjacent to the 349	  
HS2 station and collectively referred to as “Eastside” (27, 28). Creation of an Enterprise Zone 350	  
allows the local government to offer incentives for development. Eastside will take advantage of 351	  
funding for site development, access, and infrastructure; a simplified planning process; 352	  
broadband Internet service; reduced business taxes; and business development support (28). 353	  
Located in precisely the same geography as the proposed HSR station, these two projects will be 354	  
affected by the manner in which HS2 is implemented. Moreover, the projects—aimed (partially) 355	  
at providing an accessible and immediate urban experience for HSR users—are the ideal types of 356	  
HSR-supportive initiatives and therefore likely to affect the overall success of the HS2 project. 357	  
We present this case to highlight challenges and risks associated with integrating local 358	  
initiatives into a national HSR planning process. In particular, the Birmingham station 359	  
demonstrates how uncertainty may block easy integration of local proposals into HSR project 360	  
evaluation. Birmingham’s ongoing metro efforts and development planning in the station-area 361	  
are examples of the types of local initiatives that could be included into a project’s formal 362	  
evaluation. These complementary efforts hold the promise of increasing the ‘upsides’ of an HSR 363	  
project. They possess, however, both outcome-uncertainty—because real estate development is 364	  
inherently an uncertain endeavor—and stakeholder-related uncertainty from the perspective of 365	  
the national government—because future actions and investments by local governments may not 366	  
be guaranteed or fully committed at the time of HSR assessment. 367	  
 In its consultation response to the Appraisal of Sustainability, which forms the basis of 368	  
the HSR Environmental Impact Assessment, the regional transit regulator Centro urges HS2 Ltd  369	  
(the national body charged with planning HS2 is under the control of DfT, the national 370	  
Department for Transport) to incorporate local land use and accessibility changes related to local 371	  
regeneration proposals. Centro claims that the wider benefits included in the HSR assessment are 372	  
conservatively low because land use is assumed not to change: 373	  
The DfT have assumed no changes to land use will occur as a result of HSR 374	  
which is not consistent with regeneration proposals associated with the High 375	  
Speed Rail stations in the West Midlands, e.g. Eastside in Birmingham city centre 376	  
(29). 377	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As part of this research a number of meetings were conducted with representatives from Centro 378	  
and the Birmingham City Council in January of 2013 that offer further insight (Interview, 379	  
Birmingham, unpublished data). According to these officials, there are aspects of the Eastside 380	  
and Birmingham metro plans that are highly dependent on the manner in which the HS2 station 381	  
is built. The outer boundary of the HSR station determines the precise alignment for Centro’s 382	  
planned metro extension. Centro is advocating for the safeguarding of joint work sites for HS2 383	  
and the metro, as the projects are likely to occur in close sequence if not simultaneously. Design 384	  
of the HS2 station will also affect other longer-term growth plans in Birmingham. The Eastside 385	  
Masterplan includes proposals for an additional entrance on the south side of the HSR station 386	  
and for improved pedestrian connectivity to Digbeth, a neighborhood where two more Enterprise 387	  
Zone sites are (28, 30). Permeability of the station for pedestrians affects the attractiveness of 388	  
those sites for future development. 389	  
 390	  
FIGURE 1 Birmingham HS2 station area with Eastside development zone and metro 391	  
extension (Source: Author, using Centro base-map, 31) 392	  
 393	  
 The case of Birmingham highlights the importance of considering existing planning 394	  
streams (at multiple scales) when developing and HSR system design. It also points to the 395	  
challenges of planning in multi-actor environment. Local initiatives are not within the control of 396	  
the national government (at least not directly—they are influenced by national funding). 397	  
Therefore, projects at the local level that do not have fully committed designs and allocated 398	  
resources carry with them a certain uncertainty. Because of this, the national government of the 399	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UK has been reluctant to include Birmingham’s plans. However, not considering local initiatives 400	  
in this case may constrain future development and actually blocks what would generally be 401	  
considered “good” HSR planning. 402	  
 There are, of course, challenges to pursuing a broadened approach that takes into account 403	  
local initiatives. National planning authorities like HS2 Ltd have a real and legitimate need to 404	  
narrow the scope of assessments to keep them tractable and on-target. The next section discusses 405	  
one possible approach to managing the uncertainty of outcomes through inter-jurisdictional 406	  
scenario planning. Additionally, Old Oak Common provides another example of how outcomes 407	  
can be dependent to a considerable degree on initial conditions. 408	  
 409	  
Managing uncertainty of outcomes in project evaluation 410	  
 411	  
Old Oak Common (OOC) is located on the boundary between what is considered outer and inner 412	  
London (32) and is in one of the poorest areas in London (33). The site includes a unique 413	  
convergence of transport infrastructure and a significant amount of industrial land. The proposed 414	  
HSR station at OOC is viewed by Transport for London (TfL) and the London mayor’s office as 415	  
an opportunity to create a strategic interchange for west London and to achieve considerable area 416	  
regeneration (Interview, TfL, unpublished data). To further this end, London (a powerful but 417	  
nevertheless non-national government agency) is advocating for an adjustment of the HS2 plans 418	  
to include London Overground (urban rail) connections at OOC. 419	  
From a local authority’s perspective the exclusion of HSR-supportive initiatives is 420	  
undoubtedly frustrating, but there are legitimate barriers to their inclusion. The UK national 421	  
government is reluctant to include projects like the Midlands metro extension that have not yet 422	  
been full committed because of the uncertainty of their realization. Similarly, proposals for land 423	  
use changes carry with them a significant amount of uncertainty and are dependent on the real 424	  
estate market. Nevertheless, our study of London reveals ways in which the national-level 425	  
environmental process can include acknowledgment of local development and connectivity 426	  
efforts. It is, however, important to keep in mind that applying these approaches beyond London 427	  
will require concerted effort as smaller cities have less leverage and direct access to the national 428	  
government than London. 429	  
The Old Oak Common approach to managing uncertainty (for station-area 430	  
redevelopment) is via an inter-jurisdictional body called the Opportunity Area Planning 431	  
Framework (OAPF). An OAPF was created to guide the redevelopment efforts surrounding Old 432	  
Oak Common station. Local authorities (municipalities), HS2 Ltd., and Transport for London 433	  
(which operates at the scale of the Greater London Area, above the municipalities) are all 434	  
members of the framework. As part of the OAPF process, growth scenarios are produced. These 435	  
then feed back into analysis performed by HS2 Ltd. as a sensitivity test for their proposals—to 436	  
determine how the system design performs under different scenarios of future development. The 437	  
tests identify the scale of the environmental and transport impacts and are published as part of 438	  
the Environmental Impact Assessment. Now on record, these results can hopefully influence the 439	  
design of HS2 to include future proofing and scalability in anticipation of future growth in the 440	  
area (Colella, unpublished data). The use of growth and land use change scenarios produced by 441	  
an inter-jurisdictional planning framework is a promising technique for incorporating local land 442	  
use proposals into HSR assessment, despite the proposals’ uncertainty. By developing solutions 443	  
amongst multiple stakeholders, the OAPF hopefully produces a more robust set of development 444	  
scenarios than might be created by a single dominant stakeholder. 445	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Beyond the decision of whether or not to invest in additional regional connectivity, there 446	  
are other initial decisions that will impact the long-term development potential of Old Oak 447	  
Common and the success of the HSR project. At OOC planners are faced with determining the 448	  
most productive use of the land around the station. Judgments from the Opportunity Area 449	  
Planning Framework process will influence both local zoning designations and infrastructure 450	  
decisions that affect what can and cannot be built. Residential development is the safest bet in 451	  
current market conditions and therefore the most attractive with a short-term cost recovery goal. 452	  
Taking a longer view might result in a decision to pursue more mixed-use development with 453	  
both residential and commercial (and possibly even some remaining industrial) uses. 454	  
Commercial development tends to be more speculative and have a longer timeline for returns. It 455	  
is therefore riskier but also likely more strategic (Interview, TfL, unpublished data). 456	  
There is a case to be made for phased implementation, starting with less risky residential 457	  
developments adjacent to existing neighborhoods, rather than in the more industrial core of 458	  
OOC. In that way, uses can gradually build on one another. Still, some immediate infrastructure 459	  
decisions do have implications for even a more incremental development strategy.  For OOC, 460	  
designers must choose whether and how much decking to build above the rail yards that 461	  
comprise a large percentage of the land closest to the station. Decking is expensive and is not 462	  
justified by lower density development scenarios. Compared to housing, commercial uses will 463	  
benefit more from immediate station proximity. Decking is less costly to construct initially 464	  
during overall station construction than later once demand for higher density development has 465	  
materialized. The decision to build decking in effect would purchase a real option (34) to at a 466	  
later point build commercial real estate immediately adjacent to the station. This is just one 467	  
example of how initial flexibility can be a powerful tool in enabling decision-makers to respond 468	  
to future changes, thus improving overall HSR system performance (Peña-Alcaraz et al. provide 469	  
others, 34). 470	  
 471	  
CONCLUSIONS 472	  
 473	  
This paper made use of case studies from Portugal and the United Kingdom to examine the role 474	  
that uncertainty can play in inter-jurisdictional high-speed rail planning. Smaller cities to be 475	  
brought within one hour’s travel of a larger metropolitan area by HSR were the particular subject 476	  
of this analysis because of their relative disadvantage in terms of resources and influence in the 477	  
national political arena, and because such intermediate cities have a unique role to play in 478	  
achieving the sustainability objectives of high-speed rail.  479	  
 From interviews in Coimba, Évora, and Leiria in Portugal and London and Birmingham 480	  
in the UK, we find that existing processes and evaluations mechanisms affect the level to which 481	  
local knowledge can be incorporated into HSR design. We also find that certain initial decisions 482	  
and cooperative inter-jurisdictional planning can help manage the long-term uncertainty of HSR 483	  
planning and implementation. 484	  
 Coimbra offers an example of how national-local collaborative planning can produce 485	  
station-designs that are more robust and able to perform under multiple future scenarios. Évora 486	  
and Leiria demonstrate how an evaluation mechanism that values more certain current costs over 487	  
potential future benefits can result in a station-placement decision that constrains the economic 488	  
development and environmental sustainability benefits of HSR. Next, an examination of 489	  
complementary local efforts in Birmingham offers another case in which an insufficiently broad 490	  
project assessment can block potential long-term benefits from HSR. In that case the uncertainty 491	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of local initiatives that are not yet fully committed hinders the projects’ inclusion into a national 492	  
assessment of HS2. Lastly, the Old Oak Common case from London recognizes that there are 493	  
real barriers to accounting for uncertain future benefits. The Opportunity Area Planning 494	  
Framework’s approach to scenario planning suggests one method for incorporating uncertainty 495	  
into a project evaluation. Undoubtedly there will need to be additional creative solutions. 496	  
 The case studies also focus to a significant degree on establishing flexible initial 497	  
conditions: The Coimbra collaboration between REFER and the City creates a institutional setup 498	  
that can more flexibility handle changing designs needs. HSR-supportive local planning in Évora 499	  
and Leiria is at risk because of the decision earlier in the HSR planning process to locate stations 500	  
external to the cities. In Birmingham initial decisions about station design may constrain or 501	  
enable future station-area growth. And finally at Old Oak Common, the initial decision to 502	  
purchase a “real option” by building decking over the rail yards would provide flexibility to the 503	  
scope of higher-density commercial development as future market conditions allow.  504	  
 While these types of initial decisions are undoubtedly important to the long-term 505	  
performance of an HSR system, there are other factors that enable successful emergent strategies 506	  
in the implementation of a large-scale infrastructure project such as HSR. With a scope as large 507	  
as it is, any HSR project is subject to long timelines and high stakes. There will be many phases 508	  
of design and redesign. Large sums of money, not to mention political and institutional capital, 509	  
will be committed. And as with all large projects, HSR will be subject to extensive vetting and 510	  
challenge. With that challenge comes the risk that local input will receive acknowledgment but 511	  
not follow-through in the actual HSR designs. True HSR-supportive local and regional policies 512	  
(accessibility or development related) will in most cases require the commitment of additional 513	  
resources, across scales of government. This extra spending is subject to political challenge, as it 514	  
can seem secondary to the principal functionality of a HSR system—even though in reality such 515	  
efforts are integral to the system’s performance. Therefore, we will end this paper with a brief 516	  
discussion of two approaches to ensuring long-term follow through. 517	  
 The first approach is a formalization of commitments, along a spectrum from making 518	  
decisions a matter of public record (without necessarily committing resources) to complete 519	  
commitment of funding to certain aspects of a project. National entities will inevitably be 520	  
somewhat reluctant to increase the cost (or complexity) of an overall HSR project—particularly 521	  
given how difficult (or how unfamiliar, methodologically) it can be to quantify the benefit of 522	  
local HSR-supportive initiatives. Some possibilities for ensuring follow-through include:3 523	  
• Local representation in decision making groups 524	  
• Specific contractual agreements that require the HSR promoter to follow local plans 525	  
when siting stations, etc. 526	  
• Designation of a certain percentage of HSR funds for complementary schemes 527	  
• Clear inclusion of local accessibility requirements in HSR authorizing documents 528	  
Moreover, even modifying a project evaluation approach to acknowledge the importance of 529	  
connecting HSR into local contexts can be important. A formal evaluation document such as an 530	  
Environmental Impact Statement is a form of on-the-record support from the national 531	  
government. Inclusion makes the case, publicly, that the project’s success depends partly on 532	  
complementary efforts and thus increases the likelihood of allocating necessary resources in the 533	  
eventual authorization and budget allocation process. 534	  535	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Special thanks to Michael Colella of TfL for providing detailed feedback and input regarding these approaches. 
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 The second approach is more informal and depends on building broader coalitions to 535	  
support HSR-related initiatives. Earlier research has indicated that HSR is a unique opportunity 536	  
in that it has the potential to shake up a prior competitive landscape enough to incentivize 537	  
reconsideration of inter-jurisdictional relationships, both local-local and local-national (5). For 538	  
example: regional stakeholders in the West Midlands of the UK are pushing for a more strategic 539	  
view of intermodal HSR planning, extending beyond access modes, to consider the effects of 540	  
released capacity on the conventional rail network. The question of what to do with released rail 541	  
capacity may be a higher priority in the UK than in Portugal, because of faster overall growth 542	  
and greater congestion in the UK. However, it raises a more general point about HSR: its 543	  
implementation is an opportunity to take a step back and evaluate the state of a region’s transport 544	  
(or planning) system, in general. 545	  
 By leveraging the incentives for cooperation provided by HSR to work on wider regional 546	  
issues, a broader and stronger coalition for change can be created. With more than HSR on the 547	  
table, the HSR system has a better chance of achieving its potential—while at the same time the 548	  
inter-jurisdictional partnerships needed to support HSR will gain durability from stakeholders 549	  
interested in the broader vision of equitable, economically viable, and environmentally 550	  
supportive regional growth. This approach to HSR development will undoubtedly require 551	  
additional resources, beyond a bare-bones approach. Still, given the scope of the professed 552	  
agenda for HSR, it would be inconsistent not to pursue the full extent of benefits that are the 553	  
claimed target of such a large investment program. As Ureña put it so eloquently in a recent 554	  
twenty year retrospective on Spanish HSR: “High-speed rail infrastructure should not be 555	  
considered the end objective, but rather the initiation of a long process of developing actions and 556	  
strategies to enhance its effects” (35). This paper has sought to translate lessons from two 557	  
specific contexts—Portugal and the UK—into broader lessons on how to do just that. 558	  559	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